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Gonski v. Dist. Ct., 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 51 (December 30, 2010)1
CONTRACTS
I. SUMMARY
The Second Judicial District Court entered an order compelling arbitration in a
construction defect dispute. Petitioners asked for a writ of mandamus vacating the order
compelling arbitration.
II. DISPOSITION/OUTCOME
The Nevada Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus because the arbitration
provisions of the contract were unconscionable.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Donald and Linda Gonski signed a purchase agreement for a single residence from Pulte
Homes in April of 2004. At the time of the singing, Pulte presented the Gonskis with a stack of
forms amounting to 469 pages and told the Gonskis that others were willing to step in and buy
the home if they did not sign all the documents at that time. The Gonskis signed.
Months after, the Gonskis served Pulte Homes with a NRS Chapter 40 notice of
construction defects, and the parties mediated the matter. Mediation did not prove fruitful, so the
Gonskis brought suit in district court. Pulte Homes moved to compel arbitration based on the
arbitration clause of the purchase agreement. The Gonskis opposed, stating there was an
additional arbitration clause under the separate limited warranty that applied to construction
defects, and claiming that the arbitration clauses under both the purchase agreement and the
limited warranty were unconscionable and unenforceable.
The purchase agreement arbitration clause stated the following:
ARBITRATION: Any controversy, claim or dispute
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or Your purchase of the
Home (other than claims under the Limited Warranty) shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
and the Federal Arbitration Act (Title 9 of the United States Code)
and judgment rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be confirmed,
entered and enforced in any court having jurisdiction. As a
condition precedent to arbitration, the dispute shall first be
mediated in accordance with the Construction Industry Mediation
Rules of the AAA, or such other mediation service selected by Us.
Claims under the Limited Warranty will be arbitrated in
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accordance with the arbitration provision set forth in the Limited
Warranty.
In the event the claim relates to a construction defect, the
construction dispute provisions (including good-faith mediation) of
Chapter 40 of Nevada Revised Statutes shall also apply if and to
the extent that the alleged defect is covered by the Limited
Warranty.

The additional arbitration clause contained within the limited warranty stated the
following:
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
This Dispute Settlement provision sets forth the exclusive
remedy of all disputes or controversies under this LIMITED
WARRANTY.
....
If the Plan Administrator is unable to successfully mediate
the dispute, the Plan Administrator will inform THE HOMEOWNER
and THE BUILDER that the dispute is unresolved and that Binding
Arbitration is provided as a remedy for resolving the dispute.
....
Any binding arbitration proceeding will be conducted
pursuant to the United States Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.)
(“the Act”) by an independent, nationally recognized, arbitration
organization designated by the Plan Administrator. The rules and
procedures followed will be those under the Act, which may be
supplemented by the arbitration organization’s rules. A copy of
the applicable rules and procedures will be delivered to you upon
your request to the Plan Administrator.
The arbitration will determine THE HOMEOWNER’s, THE
BUILDER’s and (if applicable) the Insurer’s rights and obligations
under this LIMITED WARRANTY. These rights and obligations
include, but are not limited to, those provided to THE HOMEOWNER
or THE BUILDER by local, state or federal statutes in connection with
this LIMITED WARRANTY. The award of the arbitrator(s) will be final,
binding and enforceable as to THE HOMEOWNER, THE BUILDER and (if
applicable) the Insurer, except as modified or vacated in

accordance with the Act or the arbitration organization’s rules. A
judgment rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be confirmed, entered
and enforced in any court having jurisdiction.

The Gonskis argued that both provisions were unconscionable and, therefore,
unenforceable. In addition, they asserted that they did not have enough time to review the
documents in full and that the documents were not adequately explained to them. The district
court ruled that the arbitration clauses were not unconscionable and ordered the parties to
participate in arbitration. The Gonskis then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Nevada
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court case was heard by a panel of three justices; Justice Douglas
wrote the opinion with Justice Hardesty concurring. Justice Pickering concurred in part and
dissented in part.

IV. DISCUSSION
The Gonskis argued that the arbitration clauses in both agreements were unconscionable
and made the clauses unenforceable. The Court will not uphold an arbitration agreement if it
finds the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable..2 Both types of
unconscionability are required to make an agreement unenforceable, but Justice Douglas referred
to a California case that reasons “the stronger the showing of substantive unconscionability, the
less necessary is a strong showing of procedural unconscionability,” and vice versa.3
Procedural Unconscionability
Procedural unconscionability arises when a party has no “meaningful opportunity to
agree to the clause terms either because of unequal bargaining power, as in an adhesion contract,
or because the clause and its effects are not readily ascertainable upon a review of the contract.”4
The Nevada Supreme Court previously stated that “to be enforceable, an arbitration
clause must at least be conspicuous and clearly put a purchaser on notice that he or she is
waiving important rights under Nevada law.”5 Regarding the Pulte arbitration agreement, the
Court said that it “in no way draws the reader’s attention.” The agreement was towards the end
of an eighteen-page document and had no kind of formatting differences from the paragraphs
around it, even though some other paragraphs in the document were given more attention
through using all capital letters and bolding.
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In addition, the arbitration agreement under the limited warranty was given to the
Gonskis with a large stack of other documents and was slightly different from the agreement
under the purchase contract. Consequently, the Court said the second agreement caused the
Gonskis to forfeit specific rights without knowing it. The Court stated that although the
violations were not great, procedural unconscionability was present.
Substantive Unconscionability
Substantive unconscionability is based on the one-sidedness of the arbitration terms and
consists of terms that are oppressive.6 In the present case the Court found two occurrences of
substantive unconscionability: one with the disclaiming of arbitration expenses and the other
with the disregard of NRS Chapter 40 rights.
Arbitration Expenses
The Court held that the conflict between the arbitration clauses in the purchase agreement
and the limited warranty agreement, taken together with the one-sidedness of the clause in the
limited warranty agreement constituted substantive unconscionability. In the purchase
agreement, the clause stated that Pulte Homes would advance the fees necessary for the
arbitration. The Court said that this seemed to apply to any arbitration case between the parties.
However, in the limited warranty agreement, the clause stated that the purchaser must pay the
fees up front. This burden, along with the conflicting language in the clauses, constituted
substantive unconscionability.
NRS Chapter 40 Rights
NRS Chapter 40 was enacted to protect the rights of homebuyers, and, in contrast to
common law, allowed homeowners to bring negligence claims against contractors for
construction defects. The Court here held that contractor’s may not “limit a homeowner’s
recovery to defects covered by contract or warranty.” Doing so would defeat the public
policy of the state that created by Chapter 40.
In the current instance, Pulte Homes tried to limit its liability by using the limited
warranty agreement. Thus, the provision tried to limit Chapter 40 rights and was, therefore,
substantively unconscionable. The court said that the denial of these rights constituted
“significant substantive unconscionability.”
V. OPINION CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
In her opinion, Justice Pickering concurred that the writ of mandamus should be issued
overturning the district court’s order; however, Justice Pickering expressed her feelings that

6

Id. at 554, 96 P.3d at 1162-1163.

under the recent U.S. Supreme Court case Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson7 case, the
Gonskis’ case should have been remanded to the district court for further arguments regarding
whether the agreements contained an enforceable delegation clause. If so, Justice Pickering
reasoned that an arbitrator should be the one who determines if the arbitrator or the district court
should hear the case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the slight procedural unconscionability, the contracts’ strong substantive
unconscionability due to the disregard of NRS Chapter 40 rights created sufficient reason to
invalidate the arbitration clauses altogether.
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